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1 Introduction: Why I wrote this
Go¨del’s famous incompleteness theorems (there are two of them) concern the ability of
a formal system to state and derive all true statements, and only true statements, in
some fixed domain; and concern the ability of logic to determine if a formal system has
that property. They were developed in the early 1930s. Very loosely, the first theorem
says that in any “sufficiently rich” formal proof system where it is not possible to prove
a false statement about arithmetic, there will also be true statements about arithmetic
that cannot be proved.
Most discussions of Go¨del’s theorems fall into one of two types: either they emphasize
perceived cultural and philosophical meanings of the theorems, and perhaps sketch some
of the ideas of the proofs, usually relating Go¨del’s proofs to riddles and paradoxes,
but do not attempt rigorous, complete proofs; or they do present rigorous proofs, but
in the traditional style of mathematical logic, with all of its heavy notation, difficult
definitions, technical issues in Go¨del’s original approach, and connections to broader
logical theory before and after Go¨del. Many people are frustrated by these two extreme
types of expositions2 and want a short, straight-forward, rigorous proof that they can
understand.
Over time, various people have realized that somewhat weaker, but still meaningful,
variants of Go¨del’s first incompleteness theorem can be rigorously proved by simpler
arguments based on notions of computability. This approach avoids the heavy machin-
ery of mathematical logic at one extreme; and does not rely on analogies, paradoxes,
philosophical discussions or hand-waiving, at the other extreme. This is the just-right
Goldilocks approach. However, the available expositions of this middle approach have
1This exposition requires minimal background. Other than common things, you only need to know
what an integer is; what a function is; and what a computer program is. You do need several hours,
and you need to focus—the material is concrete and understandable, but it is not trivial. This ma-
terial was the basis for the first two lectures of my course offering “The Theory of Computation” (a
sophomore/junior level course) in October 2014.
2To verify this, just randomly search the web for questions about Go¨del’s theorem.
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still been aimed at a relatively sophisticated audience, and have either been too brief,3
or have been embedded in larger, more involved discussions.4 A short, self-contained
Goldilocks exposition of a version of Go¨del’s first theorem, aimed at a broad audience,
has been lacking. Here I offer such an exposition.
2 There are Non-Computable Functions
We start with a discussion of computable and non-computable functions.
Definition offer We use Q to denote all functions from the positive integers to {0, 1}.
That is, if f is in Q, then for any positive integer x, f(x) is either 0 or 1.
Note that since a function in Q is defined on all positive integers, the number of
functions in Q is infinite.
Definition Define a function f in Q to be computable if there is a finite-sized computer
program (in Python, for example) that executes on a computer (a MacBook Pro running
Snow Leopard, for example) that computes function f . That is, given any positive
integer x, the program finishes in finite time and correctly spits out the value f(x).
Definition Let A be the set of functions in Q that are computable.
Note that the number of functions in A is infinite. For example, the function f(7) = 1
and f(x) = 0 for all x 6= 7 is a computable function, and we can create a similar
computable function for any positive integer, in place of 7. So, since there are an infinite
number of positive integers, there are an infinite number of computable functions.
Theorem 2.1 There are functions in Q that are not computable. That is, A ⊂ Q.
Proof In this proof we would like to talk about an ordering (or an ordered list)5
of all functions in A, rather than just the set A. It might seem self-evident that such
an ordering should exist, and so one might think we could just assert that it does. But
issues of ordering are subtle; there are unsettled questions about which properties are
sufficient to guarantee that an ordering exists. So, we want to be careful and fully
establish that an ordering of the functions in A does exist.6
3For example, in Scott Aaronson’s book Quantum Computing Since Democritus.
4For example, Sipser’s excellent book on the Theory of Computation, where the exposition of Go¨del’s
theorem relies on an understanding of Turing machines and the Undecidability of the Halting problem.
Another example is An Introduction to Go¨del’s Theorems by Peter Smith, which develops much more
logical machinary before proving a variant of Go¨del’s theorem. But, for anyone wanting a readable,
deeper and broader treatment of the theorems than I present here, I highly recommend that book.
5The common notion of an ordering is more technically called a total order.
6I thank the students in CS 120 Fall 2014 who asked why an earlier draft of this exposition goes into
such detail on the existence of an ordering.
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An ordering Exists: First, choose a computer language and consider a program
in that language. Each line in a program has some end-of-line symbol, so we can con-
catenate the lines together into a single long string. Therefore, we think of a program
in that computer language as a single string written using some finite alphabet.
Now, since A consists of the computable functions in Q, for each function f ∈ A,
there is some computer program Pf (in the chosen computer language) that computes f .
Program Pf (considered as a single string) has some finite length. We can, conceptually,
order the strings representing the programs that compute the functions in A into a list L
in order of the lengths of the strings. To make the ordering perfectly precise, when there
are strings of the same length, we order those strings lexicographically (i.e., the way
they would be alphabetically ordered in a dictionary). So, each program that computes
a function in A has a well-defined position in L. Then, since each function in A is
computed by some program in the ordered list L, L also defines an ordered list, which
we call L′, containing all the functions in A.
A function f in A might be computed by different computer programs, so f might
appear in L′ more than once. If that occurs, we could, conceptually, remove all but the
first occurrence of f in L′, resulting in an ordering of the functions in A, as desired. We
will see that it will not harm anything if f is computed by more than one program in L,
and hence appears in L′ more than once. The only point that will matter is that there
is some ordered listing L′ of the functions in A that includes every function in A.
Let fi denote the function in A that appears in position i in L
′; that is, fi is computed
by the i’th program in L. (Remember that lists L and T are only conceptual; we don’t
actually build them–we only have to imagine them for the sake of the proof). Next,
consider a table T with one column for each positive integer, and one row for each
program in L; and associate the function fi with row i of T . Then set the value of cell
T (i, x) to fi(x). See Table 1.
Function f : Next, we define the function f from the positive integers to {0, 1} as
f(i) = 1 − fi(i). For example, based on the functions in Table 1, f(1) = 0; f(2) =
1; f(3) = 1; f(4) = 0; f(5) = 1
Note that in the definition of f(i), the same integer i is used both to identify the
function fi in A, and as the input value to fi and to f . Hence the values for f are
determined from the values along the main diagonal of table T . Note also that f changes
0 to 1, and changes 1 to 0. So, the values of function f are the opposite of the values
along the main diagonal of Table T . Clearly, function f is in Q.
Now we ask: Is f a computable function?
The answer is no for the following reason. If f were a computable function, then
there would be some row i∗ in T such that f(x) = fi∗(x) for every positive integer x.
For example, maybe i∗ is 57. But f(57) = 1−f57(57) 6= f57(57), so f can’t be f57. More
generally, f(i∗) = 1− fi∗(i
∗), so f and fi∗ differ at least for one input value (namely i
∗),
3
1 2 3 4 5 . x . i . . .
f1 1 1 0 0 0 f1(x)
f2 0 0 1 0 0 f2(x)
f3 1 1 0 0 1 f3(x)
f4 0 0 1 1 0 f4(x)
f5 0 1 0 0 0 f5(x)
. .
. .
. .
fi fi(i)
...
. . .
Table 1: The conceptual Table T is contains an ordered list of all computable functions
in Q, and their values at all of the positive integers.
so f 6= fi∗ . Hence, there is no row in T corresponding to f , and so f is not in set A. So
f is not computable—it is in Q, but not in A.
3 What is a Formal Proof System?
How do we connect Theorem 2.1, which is about functions, to Go¨del’s first incom-
pleteness theorem, which is about logical systems? We first must define a formal proof
system.
Definition A formal proof system Π has three components:
1. A finite alphabet, and some finite subset words and phrases that can be used in
forming (or writing) statements.7
2. A finite list of axioms (statements that we take as true); and
3. A finite list of rules of reasoning, also called logical inference, deduction or deriva-
tion rules, that can be applied to create a new statement from axioms and the
statements already created, in an unambiguous, mechanical way.
The word “mechanical” is central to the definition of rules of reasoning, and to the
whole purpose of a formal proof system:
7These words and phrases are strings in the alphabet of Π. We will say that they are a subset of
English.
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... we need to impose some condition to the effect that recognizing an axiom
or applying a rule must be a mechanical matter ... it is required of a formal
system that in order to verify that something is an axiom or an application
of a rule of reasoning, we ... need only apply mechanical checking of the kind
that can be carried out by a computer.8
For example, the alphabet might be the standard ASCII alphabet with 256 symbols,
and Axiom 1 might be:. “for any integer x, x + 1 > x.” Axiom 2 might be: “for any
integers x and y, x+y is an integer.” A derivation rule might be: “for any three integers,
x, y, z, if x > y and y > z then x > z.” (Call this rule the “Transitivity Rule”.)
The finite set of allowed English words and phrases might include the phrase: “for
any integer”. Of course, there will typically be more axioms, derivation rules, and known
words and phrases than in this example.
3.1 What is a Formal Derivation?
Definition A formal derivation in Π of a statement S is a series of statements that
begin with some axioms of Π, and then successively apply derivation rules in Π to
obtain statement S.
For example, S might be the statement: “For any integer w, w + 1 + 1 > w”. A
formal derivation of S in Π (using axioms and derivation rules introduced above) might
be:
• w is an integer, 1 is an integer, so w + 1 is an integer (by Axiom 2).
• w+1 is an integer (by the previous statement), 1 is an integer, so w+1+1 > w+1
(by Axiom 1).
• w + 1 + 1 + 1 > w + 1 > w (by the previous statement and Axiom 1).
• w + 1 + 1 > w (by the Transitivity Rule). This is statement S.
The finite subset of English used in this formal derivation includes the words and
phrases “is an integer”, “by the Transitivity Rule”, “by the previous statement” etc. .
These would be part of the finite subset of English that is part of the definition of Π.
Each phrase used must have a clear and precise meaning in Π, so that each statement in
a formal derivation, other than an axiom, follows in a mechanical way from the preceding
statements by the application of some derivation rule(s) or axioms.
Formal derivations are very tedious, and humans don’t want to write derivations this
way, but computers can write and check them, a fact that is key in our treatment of
8Go¨del’s Theorem, by Torkel Franzen, CRC Press, 2005.
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Go¨del’s theorem. (Note that what I have called a “formal derivation” is more often
called a “formal proof”. But that is confusing, because people usually think of a “proof”
as something that establishes a true statement, not a statement that might be false. So
here we use “formal derivation” to avoid that confusion.)
3.2 Mechanical Generation and Checking of Formal Deriva-
tions
We now make four key points about formal derivations.
1. It is easy to write a program P that can begin generating, in order of the lengths
of the strings, every string s that can be written in the alphabet of Π, and using allowed
words and phrases of the formal proof system Π. Program P will never stop because
there is no bound on the length of the strings, and most of the strings will not be formal
derivations of anything. But, for any finite-length string s using the alphabet of Π, P
will eventually (and in finite time) generate s.
2. A formal derivation, being a series of statements, is just a string formed from the
alphabet and the allowed words and phrases of the formal proof system Π. Hence, if s is
any string specifying a formal derivation, P will eventually (and in finite time) generate
it.
3. We can create a program P ′ that knows the alphabet, the axioms, the deduction
rules, and the meaning of the words of the allowed subset of English used in Π, so that
P ′ can precisely interpret the effect of each line of a formal derivation. That is, P ′ can
mechanically check whether each line is an axiom, or follows from the previous lines by
an application of some deduction rule(s) or axioms. Therefore, given a statement S, and
a string s that might be a formal derivation of S, program P ′ can check (in a purely
mechanical way, and in finite time) whether string s is a formal derivation of statement
S in Π.
4. For any statement S, after program P generates a string s, program P ′ can check
whether s is a formal derivation of statement S in Π, before P generates the next string.
Hence, if there is a formal derivation s in Π of statement S, then s will be generated
and recognized in finite time by interleaving the execution of programs P and P ′.
Note that most of the strings that P generates will be garbage, and most of the
strings that are not garbage will not be formal derivations of S in Π. But, if string s is
a formal derivation of statement S, then in finite time, program P will generate s, and
program P ′ will recognize that s is a formal derivation in Π of statement S.
Similarly, we can have another program P ′′ that checks whether a string s is a formal
derivation of the statement “not S”, written ¬S. So if ¬S is a statement that can be
derived in Π, the interleaved execution of programs P and P ′′ will, in finite time, generate
and recognize that s is a formal derivation of ¬S.
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4 Back to Go¨del
How do we connect all this to Go¨del’s first incompleteness theorem? We want to show the
variant of Go¨del’s theorem that says: in any “rich-enough” formal proof system where
no false statement about functions can be derived, there are true statements about
functions that cannot be derived. We haven’t defined what “true” or “rich-enough”
means in general, but we will in a specific context.
Recall function f , and recall that it is well-defined, i.e., there is a value f(x) for every
positive integer x, and for any specific x, f(x) is either 0 or 1. Recall also, that f is not
a computable function.
Definition We call a statement an f -statement if it is either:
“f(x) is 1,”
or:
“f(x) is 0,”
for some positive integer x.
Note that every f -statement is a statement about a specific integer. For example
the statement “f(57) is 1” is an f -statement, where x has the value 57. Since, for
any positive integer x, f(x) has only two possible values, 0 or 1, when the two kinds
of f -statements refer to the same x, we refer to the first statement as Sf(x) and the
second statement as ¬Sf(x).
What is Truth? We say an f -statement Sf(x) is “true”, and ¬Sf(x) is “false”, if in
fact f(x) is 1. Similarly, we say an f -statement ¬Sf(x) is true, and Sf(x) is false, if in
fact f(x) is 0. Clearly, for any positive integer x, one of the statements {Sf(x),¬Sf(x)}
is true and the other is false. In this context, truth and falsity are simple concepts (not
so simple in general).
Clearly, it is a desirable property of a formal proof system Π, that it is not possible
to give a formal derivation in Π for a statement that is false.
What does it mean to be rich-enough? We need a definition.
DefinitionWe define a formal proof system Π to be rich-enough if any f -statement can
be formed (i.e., stated, or written) in Π.
Note that the words “formed”, “stated”, “written” do not mean “derived”. The
question of whether a statement can be derived in Π is at the heart of Go¨del’s theorem.
Here, we are only saying that the statement can be formed (or written) in Π.
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4.1 The Proof of our variant of Go¨del’s Theorem
Now let Π be a rich-enough formal proof system, and suppose a) that Π has the prop-
erties that no false f -statements can be derived in Π; and suppose b) that for any true
f -statement S, there is a formal derivation s of S in Π.
Since Π is rich-enough, for any positive integer x, both statements Sf(x) and ¬Sf(x)
can be formed in Π, and since exactly one of those statements is true, suppositions a and
b imply that there is a formal derivation in Π of exactly one of the two statements, in
particular, the statement that is true. But this leads to a contradiction of the established
fact that function f is not computable.
In more detail, if the two suppositions (a and b hold, the following approach describes
a computer program P ∗ that can correctly determine the value of f(x), for any positive
integer x, in finite time.
Program P ∗: Given x, start program P to successively generate all possible
strings (using the finite alphabet and known words and phrases in Π), in
order of their lengths, breaking ties in length lexicographically (as we did
when discussing list L). After P generates a string s, run program P ′ to see
if s is a formal derivation of statement Sf(x). If it is, output that f(x) = 1
and halt; and if it isn’t, run P ′′ to see if s is a formal derivation of ¬Sf(x).
If it is, output that f(x) = 0 and halt; and if it isn’t, let P go on to generate
the next possible string.
The two suppositions a and b guarantee that for any positive integer x, this mechan-
ical computer program, P ∗, will halt in finite time, outputting the correct value of f(x).
But then, f would be a computable function (computable by program P ∗), contradicting
the already established fact that f is not a computable function. So, the two suppo-
sitions a and b lead to a contradiction, so they cannot both hold for any rich-enough
formal proof system Π. There are several equivalent conclusions that result. One is:
Theorem 4.1 For any rich-enough formal proof system Π in which no formal derivation
of a false f -statement is possible, there will be some true f -statement that cannot be
formally derived in Π.
A different, but equivalent conclusion is:
Theorem 4.2 In any rich-enough formal proof system Π in which no formal derivation
of a false f -statement is possible, there will be some positive integer x such that neither
statement Sf(x) nor statement ¬Sf(x) can be formally derived.
We leave to the reader the proof that Theorems 4.2 and 4.1 are equivalent. Theorems
4.1 and 4.2 are variants of Go¨del’s first incompleteness theorem.
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5 A Little Terminology of Formal Logic
We proved Theorem 4.1 with as little terminology from formal logic as possible. That
was one of the goals of this exposition. Still, it useful to introduce some terminology to
be more consistent with standard use.
Definition A formal proof system Π is called sound if only true statements can be
derived in Π. But note that we don’t require that all true statements be derived in Π.
Definition A formal proof system Π is called complete if for any statement S that can
be formed in Π, one of the statements S or ¬S can be derived in Π. But note that we
don’t require that the derived statement be true.
Theorem 4.2 can then be stated as:
Theorem 5.1 No formal proof system Π that can form any f statement can be both
sound and complete.
6 Go¨del’s Second Incompleteness Theorem
Definition A formal proof system Π is called consistent if it is never possible to derive
a statement S in Π and also derive the statement ¬S in Π.
Later in the course, we will talk about Go¨del’s second incompleteness theorem, which
needs more machinery. Informally, it says that if Π is rich-enough and consistent, there
cannot be a formal derivation in Π of the statement: “Π is consistent”. More philosoph-
ically, but not precisely, for any (rich enough) formal proof system Π that is consistent,
the consistency of Π can only be established by a different formal proof system Π′. (But
then, what establishes the consistency of Π′?)
7 Optional Homework Questions:
1. In two places in the proofs, ties in the lengths of strings are broken lexicographically.
I claim that this detail is not needed in either place. Is this true?
2. In the proof of Theorem 2.1, what is the point of requiring the computer programs to
be listed in order of their lengths? Would the given proof of Theorem 2.1 remain correct
if the programs were (somehow) listed in no predictable order?
3. In program P ∗, what is the point of requiring program P to generate strings in order
of their lengths? Would the given proof of Theorem 4.1 remain correct if P did not
generate the strings in that order, but could (somehow) generate all the strings in no
predictable order?
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4. Doesn’t the following approach show that f(x) is computable?
First, create a computer program P ′ that can look at a string s over the finite
alphabet used for computer programs (in some fixed computer language, for example,
C), and determine if s is a legal computer program that computes a function f in Q.
Certainly, a compiler for C can check if s is a syntactically correct program in C.
Then given any positive integer x, use program P to generate the strings over the
finite alphabet used for computer programs, in order of their length, and in the same
order as used in table T . After each string s is generated, use program P ′ to determine if
s is a program that computes a function in Q. Continue doing this until x such programs
have been found. In terms of table T , that program, call it F , will compute function fx.
Program F has finite length, so P will only generate a finite number of strings before F
is generated. Then once F is generated, run it with input x. By definition, program F
will compute fx(x) in finite time. Then output f(x) = 1− fx(x).
So, this approach seems to be able to compute f(x) in finite time, for any positive
integer x, showing that f is a computable function. Doesn’t it?
Discuss and resolve.
5. Use the resolution to the issue in problem 4, to state and prove an interesting theorem
about computer programs (yes, this is a vague question, but the kind that real researchers
face daily).
6. Show that theorems 4.1 and 4.2 are equivalent.
7. Show that a formal proof-system that is sound is also consistent. Then ponder
whether it is true that any formal proof-system that is consistent must be sound. Hint:
no.
8 What is not in this exposition?
Lots of stuff that you might see in other proofs and expositions of Go¨del’s first incom-
pleteness theorem: propositional and predicate logic, models, WFFs, prime numbers,
prime factorization theorem, Chinese remainders, Go¨del numbering, countable and un-
countable infinity, self-reference, recursion, paradoxes, liars, barbers, librarians, “This
statement is false”, Peano postulates, Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory, Hilbert, Russell, Tur-
ing, universal Turing machines, the halting problem, undecidability, ..., quantum theory,
insanity, neuroscience, the mind, zen, self-consciousness, evolution, relativity, philoso-
phy, religion, God, Stalin, ... . The first group of topics are actually related in precise,
technical ways to the theorem, but can be avoided, as done in this exposition.9 Some
of those related technical topics are important in their own right, particularly Turing
9Most expositions of Go¨del’s theorems use self-reference, which I find unnecessarily head-spinning,
and I think its use is sometimes intended to make Go¨del’s theorem seem deeper and more mystical than
it already is.
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undecidability, which we will cover in detail later in the course. The second group of
topics are not related in a precise, technical way to the theorem. Some are fascinating
in their own right, but their inclusion makes Go¨del’s theorem more mystical, and should
not be confused for its actual technical content.
9 Final Comments
The exposition here does not follow Go¨del’s original proof, and while the exposition is my
own, the general approach reflects (more and less) the contemporary computer-sciencey
way that Go¨del’s theorem is thought about, i.e., via computability. In coming to this
exposition for undergraduates, I must acknowledge the discussion of Go¨del’s theorems in
Scott Aaronson’s book Quantum Computing Since Democritus, and an exposition shown
to me by Christos Papadimitriou. Those are both shorter, aimed at a more advanced
audience, and are based on the undecidability of Turing’s Halting problem. I also thank
David Doty for pointing out an incorrect definition in my first version of this exposition.
Second, I must state again that the variant of Go¨del’s theorem proved here is weaker
than what Go¨del originally proved. In this exposition, the formal proof system must
be able to express any f -statement, but Go¨del’s original proof only requires that the
formal system be able to express statements about arithmetic (in fact, statements about
arithmetic on integers only using addition and multiplication). This is a more limited
domain, implying a stronger theorem. That difference partly explains why a proof
of Go¨del’s original theorem is technically more demanding than the exposition here.
Further, Go¨del did not just prove the existence of a true statement that could not be
derived (in any sufficiently rich, sound proof system), he demonstrated a particular
statement with that property. But, I believe that the moral, cultural, mathematical,
and philosophical impact of the variant of Go¨dels theorem proved here is comparable
to that of Go¨del’s actual first incompleteness theorem. Many modern treatments of
Go¨del’s theorem similarly reflect this view. Of course, some people disagree and insist
that anything using the phrase “Go¨del’s theorem” must actually be the same as what
Go¨del proved.10
10Although, Go¨del did not actually prove what is generally stated as “Go¨del’s theorem”, but only
a weaker form of it–which was later strengthened by Rosser to become the classic “Go¨del’s theorem”.
Accordingly, some people call it the “Go¨del-Rosser theorem”.
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